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Election Systems and VoterTurnout:
Experiments in the United States

Shaun Bowler
University of California, Riverside

David Brockington
Universiteit Twente

Todd Donovan
Western Washington University
Theory suggests that majoritarian/pluralityelections depress voter participationand that proportional election systems encourage greater voter mobilization and turnout. We examine the effect
that cumulativevoting (CV) has on turnoutin local elections in the U.S. Variationin social/cultural
context is largely held constant by our design while election system varies, allowing us to identify
the unique effect CV has on turnout. We test if turnout is higher when CV is used in the same
context as plurality rules. Consistent with expectations about institutionaleffects, turnoutis about
5 percentagepoints higher under CV than in similar plurality elections.

How much do political institutions affect levels of voter participation?Typically, this question has been addressed by predicting turnout in the major industrialized countries with models that include measures of electoral rules
(Jackman 1987; Jackmanand Miller 1995; Powell 1986). Within these studies,
the U.S. stands out as a case of exceptionally low turnout.This has generated
varying degrees of concern. For some, low or declining levels of turnout are
lamentablebut not seen as a dramaticthreatto democraticprocesses (Berelson,
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Polsby 1963). Others, however,believe that low
turnout endangers the very legitimacy or fairness of American elections (e.g.,
Amy 1993; Lijphart 1997; Piven and Cloward 1988; Teixeira 1992).
There are at least two broad, complementaryexplanations for low participation in the U.S. Individual-level(behavioral)explanationsemphasize characteristics correlatedwith participationand suggest that a sizeable proportionof the
Early versions of this paper were presented at the 1997 American Political Science Association
and 1997 Pacific Northwest Political Science Association meetings. The authorsthankBeth Cotrell
and Tracy Sulkin for assistance and the WWU Bureau for Faculty Research for partial funding.
Direct correspondenceto donovan@cc.wwu.edu
THEJOURNALOF POLITICS,Vol. 63, No. 3, August 2001, Pp. 902-915
? 2001 BlackwellPublishers,350 MainSt., Malden,MA02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road,
OxfordOX4 1JF, UK.
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electorate lack qualities that might cause them to vote (e.g., Abramson and
Aldrich 1982; Leighley and Nagler 1992; Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and
Rosenstone 1980). A second category stresses the effects that registrationbarriers, weak parties, and other rules have on depressing turnout(e.g., Alford and
Lee 1968; Caldeira, Pattersonand Markko 1985; Jackson, Brown, and Wright
1998; Nagler 1991; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Rosenstone and Wolfinger
1978; Rusk 1970).
Our study expands on these explanationsby testing if semi-proportionalelections are associated with higher turnout when used in the U.S. A number of
cross-national studies have found that proportional representation(PR) elections are associated with higher turnoutthan pluralityelections (Blais and Carty
1990; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995;
Powell 1986). These importantstudies leave room for furthertests of this effect. First, there are too few degrees of freedom to control for many of the
place-specific factors that co-vary with plurality rules in cross-national settings. For example, the Powell and Jackmanstudies use cases that share historical, social, or culturaltraitsthat co-vary with relevantelectoral arrangements.'
This is problematic since one explanation of different rates of turnout is that
nations have distinctive "political cultures" that affect their citizens' "subjective orientationto politics" (Verba 1965, 513). Importantquestions of research
design must be addressed in order to demonstratemore conclusively that electoral systems, ratherthan place-specific factors such as culture, affect turnout.
Second, cross-national studies cannot tell us what would happen to participation if a U.S. jurisdiction adopted PR.
What would be ideal, then, is the presence of variation in electoral rules
within the same social and cultural context. Current experiments with local
elections in the U.S. provide us with such a setting.2 Moreover,they also provide an opportunityto employ a quasi-experimentalresearchdesign with a large
number of cases. We test if turnout is higher in U.S. jurisdictions that use cumulative voting (CV), a semi-proportionalelection system, than in jurisdictions using plurality rules. Our research design is structuredso that we control
for place-specific factors that may confound the impact of electoral system
rules. We do this by combining a quasi-experimentalcase selection with crosssectional and longitudinal statistical analysis of turnout.
Although nearly all federal, state, and local elections are contested under
plurality rules, after the late 1980s numerous U.S. local jurisdictions began
experimenting with CV. CV combines multimember districts with a semi-

'For example, plurality SMDs are found in the English-speaking U.S., UK, and commonwealth
states (5 of the 19 cases, with an average turnoutof 72.4% between 1971 and 1980). PR is present
in Scandinavianstates (5 of the 19 cases, with a turnoutof 83.4% for this period).
2We "control"for the large variation in American cultural context, in part, by comparing many
jurisdictions within the same states.
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proportional3translationof votes to seats and lowers the proportion of votes
requiredto win a seat (Engstrom,Taebel and Cole 1989; Still 1984). At present,
about 80 jurisdictions (cities, counties, and school districts) have adopted CV,
with most concentratedin a handful of Southern states4 (Brischetto and Engstrom 1997; Cole and Taebel 1992; Cole, Taebel, and Engstrom 1990; Engstrom and Barrilleaux 1991; Pildes and Donoghue 1995).
CV was adopted on a case-by-case basis locally in response to actual or
threatenedactions under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). In the vast
majority of cases where plaintiffs bring VRA challenges against local election
rules, the remedy (reached by consent or by court order) is single-member districting (SMD). However, in a small numberof cases, plaintiffs and defendants
(local jurisdictions) have agreed to use CV5 There is no single reason why
some places adopted CV ratherthan SMD as a remedy,but contributingfactors
include the preferences of individual attorneys handling the plaintiffs' cases,
differences between defendants and plaintiffs over potential districting plans,
and local minority-group leaders' willingness to use an experimental system
(see Pildes and Donoghue 1995; Taebel, Engstrom and Cole 1988). CV also
avoids those difficulties associated with using districts in small communities.6

Mobilizing Effects of CV Elections
CV elections could have the same effects on turnoutas PR by eliminatingthe
disincentives that plurality rules have on turnout.One probabledisincentive for
voters in plurality jurisdictions is that some perceive that their votes will be
wasted. CV, like PR, allows voters from smaller (if not more) groups the possibility of voting for a winning candidate.CV could also increase voting by raising individual-levelpolitical efficacy, particularlyamong supportersof minority
candidates. Cross-nationalopinion studies illustratethat citizens in PR nations
are more satisfied with democracy (Anderson and Guillory 1997), and a panel
study of the effects of changing from plurality to PR rules in New Zealand
found that minor party supportersdemonstratedsignificant increases in efficacy after the nation's first PR election (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 1999).
3CV does not have rules that allocate seats proportionatelyto votes. Rather,it reduces the likelihood that a plurality group will win all seats, particularlyas district magnitude increases.
4Nearly all of the CV jurisdictions in this analysis are found in Texas and Alabama.There is one
CV jurisdiction each in these data from New Mexico and Illinois.
'In a number of Texas cases, plaintiffs included the League of United Latin American Citizens
(LULAC). In Alabama, they included a black political group, the Alabama Democratic Conference
(ADC). Attorneys working for these groups filed cases on behalf of individuals with standing in
various communities. LULAC and the ADC in particulareach had attorneys who worked to promote semi-PR systems. Local plaintiffs working with different attorneysmay have been much less
likely to adopt CV.These attorneys'ability to "sell" CV to a local group was one factor affecting if
it would be considered for adoption.
6These include dividing a small population into at least five districts and lowering the candidate
pool in very small districts. We thank an anonymous reviewer for noting this.
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Voters in noncompetitive races can also realize the futility of voting (Amy
1993; Cox and Munger 1989; Guinier 1994, 94-97), and CV elections may be
more competitive than plurality elections. For example, SMDs drawn with a
majority concentrationof any one group could discourage minority candidates
from seeking office since they would have a poor chance of winning.7 Fewer
candidates,moreover,might reduce the mobilizing effects of campaigns in plurality jurisdictions.8 At-large, "first past the post" rules that allow a majority
group to sweep all seats (Engstromand McDonald 1981; Taebel 1978) can have
the same effects by discouraging minority candidates from contesting races.
But with a lower proportionof votes requiredto win a seat, CV systems could
increase the incentives for candidatesto seek office. Cox (1999) has theorized
that elites respond to such electoral competitiveness by trying to mobilize more
voters.
Recent scholarship presents theoretical and empirical reasons for expecting
an increasein voter mobilizationefforts underPR (Canon 1999, 357; Cox 1999),
and by extension, semi-PR systems such as CV One key link between election
system and turnout,according to Cox, are variationsin the mobilization incentives that systems create for elites (Cox 1999, 411; see also Ladnerand Milner
1999, 248). Lower thresholds of exclusion mean more candidatesfrom nonplurality groups might seek office. Furthermore,unlike majority-minoritySMDs,
if the minority share of the participatingelectorate falls below the threshold of
exclusion, minority candidatesare not likely to win seats under CV (Brischetto
and Engstrom 1997). As noted of CV in Texas, it requires"lots of shoe leather"
for a candidateto be elected. "If there is not sufficient local mobilization to get
out the minority vote. . . the minority candidateis not likely to win" (Brischetto
1995, 8).9

Research Design and Methods
Data on turnout in local elections were requested from the largest jurisdictions in the United States that employed CV.We sought data from all CV places
having a 1990 population over 1,000 persons (n = 44). Each place adopted CV
in response to conflict over limited (or nonexistent) representationof minori'This would be even more certain if we assume that voting is polarized along racial and ethnic
lines, as is typically the case in places with VRA actions.
8 Comparedto SMD, multimemberdistrict elections of any type may be more competitive since
when the numberof candidates(c) > the numberof seats (s), then a minimum of s + 1 candidates
are competing against each other for office. Under CV in the U.S., s is always 3 or greater, so a
minimum of c = 4 can produce a contest where all 4 might campaign. Under SMD, if s = 3 and c
is 4, it is possible that only 2 compete against each other, while 2 others run uncontested.
9In Atlanta,Texas, for example, African Americans organized get-out-the-vote drives in AfricanAmerican communities to elect a candidateunder CV. In several CV towns with Latino communities, the SouthwestVoterRegistrationEducationProjecttrainedactivists for local voter mobilization
strategies. In anotherTexas town, a group called Concerned Citizens for Voting began mobilizing
voters under the first CV election (Brischetto 1995, 9).
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ties, and all have sizable minority populations. We received turnout data from
28 (or 64%) CV places.
Data also were obtained from communities using plurality elections. This set
of cases was selected so that each pluralityjurisdiction closely matched a specific CV place in key geographic and social characteristics.The 1990 U.S. Census allowed us to identify community-level measures of race and ethnicity,
population size, percentage of residents having a high school degree, and median income.10 Each CV place was matched with a plurality place that was
similar on each trait. For example, Rockford, Illinois (1990 pop. 139,426; 16%
AfricanAmerican,median income $28,282) is the pluralityjurisdictionmatched
with the CV city of Peoria, Illinois (1990 pop. 113,504; 21% African American, median income $26,074). In the end, we obtained turnout data for 21 of
the 28 pluralityjurisdictions matched with the CV places from which we received data.
These matched cases supply a control group of pluralityplaces having demographic factors highly similar to the CV places. Each control city is located in
the same state and generally in the same county as the "experimental"CV city
with which it was matched.If CV school districtsor countieswere being matched
with control cases, then similar in-state jurisdictions were identified in close
proximity to the experimentalplaces."
Between 1997 and 1999, local officials in the experimentaland controlplaces
were contacted by telephone and mail to obtain turnoutdata from recent elections. Officials in CV places were asked to supply data from their elections
held under CV and from their final three plurality elections. This allowed us to
conduct a longitudinal analysis of change in turnoutwithin the set of "experimental"communities (pre- and post-adoption of CV), in addition to the crosssectional analysis of differences in turnoutbetween the experimental(CV) cases
and the control (plurality) cases. Overall, 49 differentjurisdictions (28 CV and
21 plurality) supplied turnout data on 215 elections. 12 Table 1 reports mean
turnout levels for each group of cases and reports means for key independent
variables. Cases represent a jurisdiction's election in a specific year.13Apart
'?Demographic data were drawn either from the 1990 U.S. Census, or, in the case of school
districts, from the School District Data Book on CD-ROM published by the U.S. Department of
Education.
l The vast majorityof elections follow the municipal model of holding elections in off-year and
in odd months. For example, all Texas city council and school elections included in this analysis
are held in early May of each year. Guin, Alabama, which does hold its elections every four years
correspondingwith presidentialelections, does so in August, not November.There are no elections
in this analysis that correspondwith a national or statewide general election. The practical implication of this is that there are no national or statewide influences on turnoutin these data.
2Most jurisdictions would provide informationon turnoutfrom recent elections. Refusals were
greater when data from older elections were requested. Thus, from some places, we have longer
time series than others. The majority of these jurisdictions stagger the election of seats, with elections for three or four seats held annually or every two years in many places.
3 For example, case 1 = electionij, where i is an individual election year and j is the jurisdiction.
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TABLE 1

Descriptive Characteristics: All Cases, Control,
and Experimental Groups

All
Elections

Continuous
Plurality
Elections
(Control)

Plurality
Elections
Prior to CV
(Exp Pre)

CV Elections
after Switch
from Plurality
(Exp Post)

Turnout%
Minority %
High School Education%

19 (14)
38 (14)
56 (10)

17 (16)
38 (14)
56 (09)

18 (12)
37 (14)
55 (10)

23 (13)
38 (16)
55 (11)

Median Income $

19,756
(3877)

21,210
(3910)

18,807
(3308)

19,263
(3989)

215

72

74

69

Variable

Total Number of Elections

Note: Main entries are means, standarddeviations in parentheses. Control groups: Places using
plurality elections continuously, matched with demographic and geographic traits of CV places.
Experimental pre: Places using plurality contests prior to using new CV system. Experimental
post: CV places after switching from plurality.

from slight variations in median income, the jurisdictions in each group are
nearly identical. Our control group (from the matched places) includes results
from 72 plurality elections.'4 We also have turnout data for 74 at-large elections held in CV places prior to their adopting CV and 69 subsequentCV elections from those places.
The plurality (control) cases had slightly lower but statistically insignificant
differences in mean turnoutlevels when comparedto plurality elections held in
the experimental(CV) places. Previous to their adoption of CV, our experimental communities averaged 17.9% turnout,which is comparableto 17.1% turnout for other pluralityjurisdictions in our study. In keeping with expectations
about the effects of semi-PR rules on participation,turnout was 5.6% higher
(23.5%) in the experimentalcases after their adoption of CV An ANOVA test
determinedthat there are significant differences in turnoutbetween these three
categories (F(2,212) = 3.85, p = .02). A dependentsamples t-test of the difference between mean turnout levels in the experimentalplaces before and after
changing to CV indicates a significant difference (t = 2.91, p = .005). There is
no significant difference between the control and pre-experimentalgroups.

Hypotheses and Model Specification
We estimate cross-sectional regression models of turnout across all places
(control, experimentalpre-CV,and experimentalpost-CV) as well as longitudi1454 of these were conducted under at-large rules, while 18 were conducted under districted
elections.
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nal models focusing on places experimenting with CV Our discussion suggested several testable hypotheses. Clearly, if semi-PR election rules increase
elite incentives to mobilize voters, make contests more competitive, or increase
voter efficacy, then turnout should be higher under CV. Although we cannot
specify the actual mechanism that operates in CV elections to affect turnout,
we can isolate the general effect of election rules in a regression equation by
using a dummyvariable,where 1 = a CV election, and 0 = a plurality election.
The coefficient for this term representsthe difference in turnoutbetween plurality and CV elections.
Given the controls built into our research design, we can be ratherconfident
that this dummy variable captures differences that stem from election rules.
However, since we anticipatethat communities with a larger proportionof minority residents might have lower turnout,independentof the election system,
our models include a variable that representsthe proportionof voting age residents who are nonwhite. In addition to the relative size of the minority population, the specific type of minority is also relevant. Language barriers or
citizenship status may mean that Latinos did not turn out at the same rate as
other voters. Indeed, studies have found that Latinos turn out at relatively lower
ratesthan whites andAfricanAmericansin variouselections (Stanley and Niemi
1995, 79; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989). We include a dummy variablethat
representsplaces where Latinos were the largest minority group.15To control
for variation in the social composition of these places, we also include a measure of median income. We assume that places with higher median incomes
have more residents who have the resources to participate in politics.'6 Since
voters may take less interest in school elections, we also include a dummy
variablethat distinguishes school board from city and county council elections.
Participationmight also be lower in larger communities for a number of reasons (see Key 1949; Verbaand Nie 1972, 231). Since there are few cases in our
analysis with populations over 100,000, there is an extreme rightwardskew in
the distributionof this variable. As a result, we found it necessary to use the
log of population as a control.

Cross-Sectional Results
Table 2 reports the results of a set of cross-sectional estimations of turnout
that compare plurality places (control and experimentalpre-CV cases) to CV
5Given the nature of these data, all communities had a sizable minority population. However,
no jurisdictions had a large Latino and African-Americanpopulation simultaneously.The dummy
variablethus = 1 (Latino the largest minority) or = 0 (African American the largest minority). The
majorityof elections (86%) were contested where Latinos were the predominantminority group.
16Likewise, aggregate levels of education could also affect participation. Our measures of income and education, however, are highly correlated (.80), and both are strongly correlated with
population (each over .65). To avoid problems of multicollinearity,we omit the measure of education. When education is substitutedfor income, the substantiveresults do not change.
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TABLE 2

Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis Models
of Turnout in Local Elections

CV Election System
Minority Population
School Board Election
Latino Community
Population(logged)
Median Income
Intercept
R2 (adjusted)
Number of cases

All
Elections

Matched
by Place

Matched by
Place and Time

.052**
(.015)
-.123*
(.075)
-.028*
(.016)
-.267**
(.032)
- .028**
(.008)
.00002
(.00002)
.692**
(.080)

.050**
(.019)
-.098
(.093)
-.026
(.021)
-.223**
(.039)
- .029**
(.010)
.00002
(.00003)
.605**
(.097)

.047*
(.028)
-.030
(.144)
-.007
(.034)
-.264**
(.061)
- .023
(.014)
.00004
(.00003)
.526**
(.141)

.449

.318

.333

215

164

82

Note: Dependent variable = turnoutas a proportionof voting age population. Standarderrors in
parentheses.
** = significant at p < .01 (one-tail)
* = significant at p < .05 (one-tail)

places. The first column reports an OLS estimation using data from all 215
elections 72 from plurality control places, 74 plurality elections held in experimentalplaces prior to adopting CV, and 69 from experimentalplaces after
adopting CV The second column lists estimates from a set of cases limited to
elections from the experimental and control jurisdictions that were matched
This set includes63 pluralityelections fromthe controlgroup,
demographically.17
50 plurality elections from places that would end up adopting CV, and 51 CV
elections. Cross-sectional comparisons are furtherrefined in the third column
with an estimation limited to CV and plurality elections matched by place as
well as time.18This includes 41 CV elections and 41 plurality elections held in
similar places at the same time.
The primary variable of interest is the dichotomous measure that indicates
whether an election was run under CV According to each of our cross17This first estimation in Table 2 includes elections from 7 CV places for which we obtained
turnoutdata that lack matching data from pluralityjurisdictions.
'8Since time series for places vary in length, cases are lost when the estimation is limited to
when time of election and place are matched.
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sectional estimates, elections held under CV do result in a turnoutrate significantly higher than elections run under traditionalplurality schemes. The effect
of CV ranges from an increase of 4.7 to 5.2 percentage points, depending on
the set of cases being assessed.19The substantive impact of CV elections appears modest when we consider that an increase in national turnout of 5 percentage points would be a relatively small proportionatechange in participation.
The effect is more impressive, however,when the range of local turnoutacross
these cases is considered.20For a jurisdiction having the mean turnout(19%), a
5 percentagepoint increase is, proportionately,a substantialgain.
Several coefficients for control variables are also significant. In the estimation including all elections, there is an independenteffect of the type of office
being contested. When school board elections are held separately,fewer voters
turn out. The log of population is also significant in the first two estimations,
with largerjurisdictionshaving lower turnout.Jurisdictionswith Latinos as their
primaryminority group had lower turnoutrates, and the coefficient representing Latino communities is both substantivelyas well as statistically significant
in each estimation. Finally, no estimation demonstratesa significant effect of
median income, although the direction of the coefficients suggests wealthier
communities have higher participation.

Longitudinal Results
Thus far we have assumed that plurality and CV places were matched on all
relevant variables except election system. With perfect matching, the term for
CV elections would capturethe unique effect of election type. Despite care in
matching, however, it is possible that the CV term also captures other factors.
Given this limitation, we also estimate longitudinalmodels of turnout.By looking only at the jurisdictions that experimentedwith CV,we test for change over
time in places that are directly affected by the adoption of CV Table 3 reports
these longitudinal estimates. The CV term represents the intervention of the
adoption of CV and thus reflects the increase in turnout after elections were
conducted under CV The first estimation makes use of turnout data from 143
elections in the experimentalplaces 74 were plurality contests and 69 were
conducted after switching to CV
Heilig and Mundt (1984) found that the adoption of new SMD systems can
be associated with a short-termsurge in turnoutdue to increased electoral competition, but participation may drop after the first election. A similar effect
could occur with CV contests. Likewise, mobilization efforts by local groups
could be one-time educational affairs that produce an increase in turnout only
9The size and significance of the effect of election system reportedin each estimate in Table 2
remain largely unchangedwhen dummy variables for year are included in the models.
20The dependent variable (turnout)has a mean of .19 and a standarddeviation of .14. It ranges
from .017 to .682. The distributionhas a noticeable but not severe right tail, with only one case
lying furtherthan three standarddeviations from the mean.
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TABLE 3

Longitudinal Regression Analysis Models of Turnout in Local Elections

Adoption of CV Election System

CV Places,
Before & After
Adopting CV

CV Places,
Before & After,
Excluding First Two
CV Elections

.040**
(.016)

.051**
(.023)

(.077)
-.247**
(.039)
-.036**
(.018)
-.050**
(.011)
-.00001
(.00003)
.889**
(.091)

-.093
(.098)
-.248**
(.046)
-.027
(.022)
-.047**
(.014)
-.00002
(.00003)
.793**
(.112)

-.017
(.018)
-.143
(.098)
-.251**
(.041)
-.028
(.019)
-.020*
(.009)
-.00001
(.00002)
.603**
(.103)

.447

.446

.438

143

98

146

After 1993
Minority Population
Latino
School Board Election
Population(logged)
Median Income
Intercept
R2 (adjusted)
Number of cases

Non-CV
Places Only

-.125*

Note: Dependent variable = turnoutas a proportionof voting age population. Standarderrorsin
parentheses.
** = significant at p < .01 (one-tail)
*
significant at p < .05 (one-tail)

after initial CV elections. The second estimation in Table 3 excludes the first
two CV elections in each jurisdiction to test if increased turnout is sustained
after the first two CV contests. We include a third estimation in Table 3 to take
full advantage of our research design. Here, we test if turnout has increased
over time in places that did not adopt CV. A dummy variable representingall
elections contested after 1993 is included to test this.21
Most of the coefficients in Table 3 appear similar to the estimates from the
cross-sectional analysis (Table 2). Of primaryinterest here is that the effects of
CV in Table 3 are largely consistent with those reportedin Table 2, in the range
of 4-5.1 percentage point increase in local turnoutafter a jurisdiction adopted
CV Overall, the results in Table 3 demonstratethat when a fixed set of jurisdictions in the U.S. switches from plurality to semi-PR election rules, we do
21
We use 1993 as a break point since half of the non-CV elections were conducted after that
year.
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see a significant, sustained increase in turnout.22Estimates in the second column illustrate that turnoutremains 5 percentage points higher than under plurality elections after the second CV contest.23Moreover,we find that there was
no increase in turnoutafter 1993 in similar places that never adopted CV24

Conclusion
Our analysis demonstrates that CV is associated with higher turnout than
plurality elections in the U.S. CV thus offers the promise of increasedrepresentation of minorities coupled with increased participation.The size of the effect
appears to be a modest but noteworthy 4% to 5% boost in participation.The
jurisdictions examined here adopted CV because their at-large plurality voting
plans created barriersto descriptiverepresentationof minorities. When actions
are taken against these plans under the VRA, courts typically accept other plurality systems that produce minority representation (e.g., SMDs). Semiproportionatealternatives to these systems, such as CV, have been found to
facilitate minority representationat levels approachingwhat is found under districting(Brischettoand Engstrom1997; Cole and Taebel 1992; Pildes and Donoghue 1995). Ourresults illustratethat the institutionaleffects of these alternative
electoral rules extend beyond just facilitating descriptive representation.
Our quasi-experimentaldesign, controlled case selection, and model estimations demonstratethat the effect of CV on turnoutis not an artifactof an analysis that fails to controlfor place-specific (cultural,social, political, or geographic)
factors. All of this suggests quite strongly that some underlying processes associated with CV act to mobilize more voters than plurality elections do. If
political reformers are interested in increasing participation in U.S. elections,
these findings could be taken as evidence that PR or semi-PR rules could stimulate greater participation,at least in local elections where the potential problem of low turnoutis most severe.
Advocates of electoral reform might find satisfaction in the link we find
between institutionalrules and participation.Yet the findings could also cast a
minor shadow over claims advancedby proponentsof PR. If we can generalize
from local elections in these mostly small jurisdictions, increasedproportional22Models omitting only the first CV contest produce similar results. The size and significance
of the effect of election system also remain largely unchangedwhen dummy variables for year are
included in the models.
23 We also estimated models using data from the CV elections held in places that had at least two
or more contests under CV We replaced the term for election system with a variable representing
the number of times a place had a CV election. Results illustratedthat the coefficient for election
iteration was trivial (-.009), and not at all significant (p = .52). Thus, the increase in local election turnout demonstratedhere does not appear to be the function of some short-lived novelty
effect.
24Wealso estimated models for elections in non-CV places using a time-counter,using dummy
variables for individual years, and using other years as break points. The substantive results are
unchanged in each estimation.
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ity in the electoral formula does not appearto be a magic bullet that will resolve problemsof low participationin the U.S.: turnoutincreased,but it remained
low. As noted above, there are numerous behavioral, structural, and institutional factors at play here. Election rules, however,are one of many small pieces
of the puzzle of low turnoutin the U.S.
The results of this study do lend support to cross-national findings that institutionalrules affect turnout.We find that even when cultural and social factors are largely controlled, pluralityrules continue to demonstratea deleterious
effect on participation. Indeed, we find about the same effect that Blais and
Dobrzynska (1998) identify with cross-nationaldata, and we find results close
to the 3%-7% effect that Ladner and Milner (1999) find PR has on local contests in Switzerland. Given this, and the modest effect that semi-PR election
rules have on turnout within the U.S., we suggest that attitudinal,behavioral,
and other institutional differences explain much of the participation gap between the U.S. and nations that use PR.
Manuscriptsubmitted30 August 1999
Final manuscriptreceived 29 January 2001
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